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Women, Protest and Revolution: Soldiers’ wives in Russia 
During 1917 
Summary 
This study explores the role and political impact of soldiers’ wives in three Volga 
provinces of Russia, Nizhnii Novgorod, Kazan and Tambov, between February and 
October 1917.  Despite relatively low levels of formal organisation, soldiers’ wives 
made a significant mark on revolutionary politics at a local level. Common 
grievances, which centred on the inadequacy of state support in the context of rising 
food prices and shortages, were the defining feature of soldiers’ wives as a group. 
Though they secured little direct representation in government, and did not affiliate 
with any political parties, they operated collectively to address their grievances, both 
in petitions and in public demonstrations. Their demands continued to escalate in 
1917, and the government was unable to cushion them from Russia’s profound 
economic crisis. Soldiers’ wives rejected both Soviet and Provisional Government 
leadership as a result, and their alienation contributed to the sense of political crisis 
that pervaded 1917. 
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Women, Protest and Revolution: Soldiers’ wives in Russia During 
1917.* 
Introduction 
Soldiers’ wives played one of the most prominent and best-known roles in the 
February revolution. Their demonstrations in Petrograd alongside other women on 
International Women’s Day were the spark that lit the conflagration of revolution.1 
The toppling of the Tsarist regime in February 1917 heralded an eight month 
interregnum, during which the Provisional Government, a shifting coalition of liberals 
and moderate socialists, strove above all else to keep Russia in the war, and to avoid 
the civil conflict that loomed in an atmosphere of rising social, political and economic 
crisis. The Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in October 1917 ended the Provisional 
Government’s term in power, and marked the beginnings of civil war. The Provisional 
Government’s fall was symptomatic of its inability to breach Russia’s widening social 
polarisation, and to meet the heightened expectations produced by the February 
revolution. Soldiers’ wives (referred to throughout as soldatki) were an important 
societal group whose frustration escalated as their demands remained unmet in the 
course of 1917. Soldatki have been largely excluded from the master narrative of 
1917.2 There is a massive body of literature tackling the events of 1917, but there has 
been a tendency in the historiography to focus on the activities of the organized and 
the ‘conscious’, which privileges male forms of collective action at the expense of 
female. Where female activities have been considered, they have concentrated on 
women within clearly defined social groups.3 Soldatki encapsulated a diverse range of 
social groups, and present an opportunity to explore the participation of an amorphous 
group of women in revolutionary politics.  
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A bewildering array of interest groups formed as a result of the social 
dislocation caused by World War One. Refugees, orphans, prisoners of war, invalids 
and the disabled all formed associations whose aim was primarily to defend their 
interests.4 With the exception of the soldiers themselves, soldatki comprised the 
largest and most vocal of these groups. This paper seeks to explore the role and 
political impact of soldatki from February to October 1917 in the guberniias5 of 
Kazan, Nizhnii Novgorod and Tambov. It is argued that despite relatively low levels 
of formal organisation, soldatki made a significant mark on revolutionary politics at 
the local level. Further, the moderate socialist leadership of local democratic organs 
was undermined by the disillusion of soldatki, and prefigured the more politically 
significant alienation of many workers and soldiers by October 1917. 
The regional focus of this study has been taken with the intention of presenting 
a more nuanced view of revolutionary events. Local and regional factors were crucial 
in determining the direction and character of social and political behaviour. Nizhnii 
Novgorod, Kazan and Tambov guberniias are all situated in central European Russia, 
and bisected by the Volga river, Russia’s primary artery. (INSERT MAP HERE)  
Nizhnii Novgorod guberniia was among Russia’s most important industrial centres, 
with large metalworking factories employing some 70,000 workers. Tambov, on the 
other hand, was best known as a grain-producing province, and was considered to 
have been the Socialist Revolutionary Party’s spiritual home. Kazan presents an 
entirely different profile; as the ‘gateway to Siberia’, it formed a major trading and 
transport centre, and was very ethnically diverse. These three guberniias can be taken 
to loosely exemplify the principal aspects of agricultural and industrial European 
Russia. By focusing on soldatki actions in three guberniias, a view of revolutionary 
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events can be developed which reflects regional specificity, and avoids crude 
generalisation.6  
The emergence of soldatki as a prominent social group was predicated by the 
mass mobilisation following Russia’s declaration of war on Germany on August 4 
1914. Though the formal translation of soldatka was a soldier’s wife, the term was 
often used more broadly in 1917 to include other female dependents, and files of 
letters from soldatki often included correspondence from a range of family members. 
Soldatki had always been a significant minority group among married women,7 but 
mass mobilisation caused soldatki numbers to swell dramatically. Estimates of the 
numbers of men mobilised during World War One vary, but Wildman suggests a total 
mobilisation figure of 15.3 million.8 One can correspondingly estimate soldatki 
numbers at around fourteen million. The prominence of the category soldatka in 
appeals and declarations indicates that it was chosen by a range of women as a social 
definition. All those defining themselves as soldatki had other social categorisations 
that they could subscribe to, and some used a double barrel to describe themselves, 
such as worker-soldatka or peasant-soldatka.    
Soldatki grievances 
Common grievances provided the central defining feature for soldatki as a group. The 
most widely expressed demand was for an increase in the allowance that was provided 
to the soldiers’ families. This was often submitted by soldatki from a particular village 
or volost jointly. The dramatic increase of price on products of first necessity, 
alongside rampant inflation, left soldatki who relied on the state allowance for 
subsistence in an unenviable position of impoverishment, something commented upon 
by a range of sources. Nizhegorodskaia guberniia’s executive committee, for 
example, commented on the “scandalous distress” (vopiushchaia nuzhda) many 
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soldatki were in,9 while a writer in a Kazan newspaper commented that some soldatki 
were “utterly destitute” (gol’ perekatnaia).10 This state of crisis escalated in the course 
of 1917. Material need was perhaps the deciding factor in their drive to organise 
themselves collectively. Demands for supply of food products tended to reflect the 
provisions situation in the guberniias. Nizhegorodskaia guberniia faced a provisions 
crisis that threatened famine from the outset of 1917.11 As one might expect, demands 
there focused on the supply of sufficient bread. In Kazan guberniia, which produced 
grain for export, grain shortages were not so widespread, yet demands for provisions 
were just as vociferous, and encompassed, instead of cries for the staple of life, 
demands for sugar and white flour.12 Where there was a shortage, even if, like sugar, 
it did not threaten life, this shortage became a major issue of the day, and took on 
equivalent or even greater force than demands for bread in a hungry guberniia.13 
Other categories of complaint were requests for free, or subsidised fuel, refusal 
or inability to pay taxes, about non-payment of state allowance, about the status of 
common law wives, shortage of housing, landlord attempts to evict soldatki, and 
requests for husbands, fathers and sons to be given leave in order to help with field 
work.14 There were also more specific personal grievances. The Kazan guberniia 
Soviet of peasants’ deputies, for example, asked the Voskresenskii volost15 committee 
to intercede on behalf of the soldatka Olga Makarevna Egorova, of Gorkii village, 
Voskresenskii volost, whose father-in-law Semion Egorov had thrown her out of her 
house without compensation, forcing her and her little son to live with strangers.16 
Egorova’s complaint demonstrates the willingness of soldatki to bring a host of 
grievances to the attention of the Soviets. 
The tsarist government had made some attempt to define the category soldatka 
more clearly, in order to establish who was to be eligible for state support. The 
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resulting law, passed on 25 June 1912, was ambiguous.17 All wives and children of 
soldiers called into active service were theoretically eligible for state allowance, 
which was administered as a monetary sum. Common law wives and their children 
were not, however, included in this remit, which was a significant omission.18 The 
Provisional Government was put under pressure to revise this statute, and in June 
1917 it broadened the criteria for eligibility to include common law wives, foster 
children and stepparents. 19 This broadening of the category, along with an increase in 
the number of applications for support, increased the already enormous financial 
burden soldatki support imposed on the state. The number of recipients of state 
allowance increased from twenty-five million in 1916 to thirty-six million by 
September 1917.20 From the outbreak of the war until January 1917, aid to soldiers’ 
families cost around two billion roubles, which was some seven percent of Russia’s 
total military expenditure.21 Between February and October 1917, 1.46 billion roubles 
were spent on allowances, which accounted for nearly eleven percent of military 
expenditure.  
This vast expenditure, and its effective allocation, was an enormous burden on 
Russia’s overstrained economy and administration. The law of 1912 had established a 
network of committees to minister to soldatki needs, but even before the 
administrative and financial disarray that resulted from the February revolution, the 
state was unable to meet soldatki demands. The ‘Nizhegorodskaia guberniia 
committee for the assistance of sick and wounded military and the families of drafted 
men’ met on 13 February 1917 to discuss a potential increase in the allotment of 
money for the needs of families of drafted men. The chair of the meeting, P.A. 
Demidov,22 pointed out that the debt incurred by the guberniia zemstvo23 in providing 
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assistance to needy families had risen to 650,000 roubles.24 The meeting concluded 
that: 
[...] The committees simply cannot fulfil their initially stated principle, to show 
assistance to all families requesting help, and the role of the committees now must be 
to show assistance to those groups of the population who are in the most unfavourable 
situations, for example those excluded from state allowance (common law wives, 
families situated in active service) [...] Monetary assistance must have a place only in 
exceptional cases, since the population are needy, in the main, not for money, but for 
products, and in relation to this very question, both uezd25 and guberniia committees 
are not in a position to assist. Any increase of money to the uezd organisations must 
be looked over thoroughly, as experience has shown that these uezd committees have 
not been very active locally, because their organisation suffers from grave 
insufficiencies.26 
These committees continued to function in 1917, but were supplemented by 
the efforts of the Soviets, Provisional Government organisations and ad hoc 
committees. This amalgam of organisations bearing some responsibility for 
administering aid to soldatki only contributed to the administrative confusion and 
inefficiency that was a theme of soldatki complaints. The main difficulty for the state 
in administering aid to the soldatki was not administrative confusion, however, but 
financial crisis.27 Administrative bodies repeatedly stated that they would like to help 
soldatki more, but had no funds available. Problems were compounded by the grain 
situation, which deteriorated in the course of 1917. Supply problems were regional or 
even local in nature, but the lack of an effective transport infrastructure meant that 
some areas faced hunger or even starvation by the autumn of 1917, even where 
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neighbouring provinces enjoyed grain surpluses. In Nizhegorodskaia guberniia, there 
were chronic grain shortages from the outset of 1917.28 Some areas of Kazan 
guberniia also faced hunger by the autumn of 1917, even though it was bordered by 
grain rich Tambov.  
The New Order 
The diversity and local specificity of the organisations that developed in the wake of 
the tsarist administration’s collapse are bewildering in their scope. The Provisional 
Government sought to establish a structure of local government, headed by the 
guberniia commissar and the uezd commissars, a rank given to uezd zemstvo 
chairmen.29 Various public committees, commonly named ‘committees of public 
safety’ formed in the immediate aftermath of revolution, often encompassing the most 
experienced administrators of the locality. These committees in some places formed a 
nucleus of support for the activities of the guberniia and uezd commissars. The 
Soviets of soldiers, workers and peasants’ deputies evolved autonomously.30 All these 
myriad forms of local government shared the aspiration to represent and defend all 
sectors of the community. In the case of the Soviet, this representation and defence 
was targeted specifically at all toiling and impoverished (trudiashchiisia i 
obezdolennyi) people.  
Whilst the February revolution compounded the administrative and financial 
difficulties of administering aid to soldatki, it simultaneously heightened expectations 
of government, heralding significant changes in both the mechanics and in popular 
expectations of local administration. The rhetoric of revolution promised equality, 
freedom and justice. Soldatki clearly took this new rhetoric on board, and expected the 
new democratic administration’s lofty ideals to translate into real improvements in 
soldatki conditions. Democratisation was popularised across Russian administration at 
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all levels, from the lowliest volost committee to the guberniia head. The forming of 
interest groups was commonplace in 1917, whether these were based on occupation, 
political affiliation, nationality, gender or other shared interests. Soldatki, as a group 
sharing common grievances, formed a powerful if amorphous group that could place 
its requests and complaints to the administration at a level and a persistency that was 
not possible prior to the revolution.  
Soldatki secured little direct representation in the myriad forms of government 
that were established in the wake of the February revolution. This is a reflection of the 
absence of women from all levels of administration, from the village skhod31 up to 
delegates for the Constituent Assembly.32 At lower levels of organisation, on volost 
and uezd executive committees, the delegates were almost exclusively male. If a 
woman did have a place, it was usually the place allotted to a teacher’s 
representative.33 A cursory examination of lists of Soviet deputies demonstrates that 
women were very rarely elected as deputies to the Soviet, and correspondingly very 
rarely participated in the Soviet’s higher committees.  The reasons for this are based 
on the domination of the democratisation process, particularly at grassroots level, by 
local working men and soldiers. Women were only given the right to vote, and the 
opportunity to serve in elected offices, in summer 1917, though the informal voting 
procedures in many Soviet bodies allowed female participation from the outset of the 
revolution. Russia’s democratisation process explicitly appealed to the electorate in 
1917, and the electorate responded by returning almost entirely male representation 
on the democratised bodies of 1917.34 This comment on women’s participation in 
public life, from a report compiled by the Provincial Section of the Temporary 
committee of the State Duma in April, is telling: 
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There is opposition from workers and peasants to the participation of women in 
elections. Nothing is said to women, and in places not only do they not participate in 
the building of public life, but often they also don’t know about their rights that they 
received in the course of the revolution. When delegates tried to clarify the situation 
they said that up until now they didn’t know anything and thanks to this they knew 
nothing. Greeting similar conversations, the peasants with resentment observed, “You 
stir up our women, then they will not go into the shafts.” And there are almost no 
cases of women being elected in the village.35 
There were even specific cases of soldatki being refused the right to 
participate in volost administration. A complaint was received from thirteen soldatki 
of Nizhnii Novgorod guberniia that a deputy of their volost administration, in answer 
to their question of why a soldatka deputy had not been allowed to participate, 
answered: 
[...] Obviously, it’s unnecessary to allow riffraff (svolochi) into the workplace, and it 
is better to close the doors to keep such riffraff out.36 
Soldatki organisation and actions 
The non-participation of women in the newly democratised local government 
structures left soldatki, a large and well-motivated group, on the margins of power. 
They were to have significant impact on the course of local government, but their 
participation was from the periphery, and not from the heart of local government. 
Soldatki formed autonomous organisations that did not work strictly within the sphere 
encompassed by the Soviets, but overlapped with it. There was a union of soldatki 
formed at national level by the Petrograd Soviet in June 1917,37 but no reference was 
made to any central soldatki organisation in Kazan, Nizhnii Novgorod or Tambov. 
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The alliances of soldatki that formed in the guberniias of Nizhnii Novgorod, Kazan 
and Tambov shared common grievances within the context of local conditions, but 
developed in quite distinct directions, reflecting the importance of individual 
leadership in forming these organisations. Unfortunately the sources make almost no 
reference to the individuals who were prominent in the soldatki organisations, making 
impossible any more detailed assessment of soldatki leaders. It is however possible to 
present a broader picture of soldatki organisation and leadership.  
At an early stage of 1917 the Nizhegorodskaia guberniia Soviet of workers 
and soldiers’ deputies was careful to embrace the soldatki in its remit. The women 
were invited to send a representative to the Soviet’s meetings. Though the demands of 
the soldatki in Nizhegorodskaia guberniia were numerous, and acknowledged across 
all levels of administration, they did not form their own autonomous association, and 
did not put any external pressure on the Soviet. The Soviet’s careful embracing of the 
soldatki at an early stage may well have given the soldatki a sufficient degree of 
public outlet, and thus averted the build up of sufficient discontent required for the 
soldatki to operate independently of the Soviet. Their lack of vocal representation in 
public forums reflects a lack of concerted leadership for the Nizhnii soldatki.  
In Tambov, too, soldatki did not themselves form a recognised body, though 
in August a union of soldatki was formed by the Soviet.38 This was a retrospective 
measure aimed at restraining and containing the Tambov soldatki movement, which 
from the very outset of revolution formed a stormy and volatile force in local 
politics.39 Despite their high level of activity, the Tambov soldatki apparently lacked 
internal leadership. In the general meeting of soldatki organised by the Soviet on 8 
October 1917, both president and secretary of the meeting were men,40 which would 
indicate that even by autumn 1917, the soldatki had not found leadership from within 
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its group. This was certainly the case earlier in 1917. A soldatki meeting was 
organised on 21 March by two renegade soldiers, Shvedov and Krupenin, where 
speeches of  “a rousing nature” were heard. In its meeting on 22 March by the Soviet 
of workers and soldiers’ deputies denounced Shvedov and Krupenin, and appealed to 
the population that: 
The speeches of these private individuals were not from any direct organisation and 
were to be treated with great caution [...]41 
The soldatki did not, however, heed the warnings of the presidium regarding 
the two soldiers, and on 25 March there was a further meeting of soldatki, led by 
Krupenin and Shvedov. In this the soldatki specifically rejected Soviet leadership. 
Three delegates from the Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies appealed to the 
soldatki, and rhetorically asked them whether it was better to trust separate individuals 
or organisations. The soldatki, however, supported Krupenin and Shvedov, and gave 
them red armbands to wear as a sign of their trust. The Soviet’s representatives, 
having been so demonstratively shunned, left the meeting. Krupenin and Shvedov 
were apparently unable to call the Tambov soldatki to order. A reporter scathingly 
described the chaos of the meeting: 
The meeting’s leaders went on to discuss current questions, and the distribution of 
1000 roubles allocated by the public committee. There wasn’t just one meeting, but 
several, as different questions were discussed in different corners. It was impossible to 
come to any sort of decision. It was funny; Shvedov shouted to comrade soldatki that 
they should address their delegates for the distribution of the 1000 roubles. But the 
soldatki just stayed in their corners and tried to out-shout each other. It was possible 
only to establish that those situated closer to the president declared that the 1000 
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roubles would be sent to the front. It has to be added here that the 1000 roubles was in 
the hands of the public committee and not with Shvedov and Krupenin; the money 
would only be transferred to some sort of organisation and not to separate individuals. 
There was around three hours of pointless chatter before the soldatki dispersed to their 
homes. In the evening soldatki delegates came to the Soviet of workers and soldiers 
deputies and asked for a clarification of what they should now do, as Shvedov and 
Krupenin could not give them anything but words.42 
The soldatki of Kazan guberniia, in contrast to those in Tambov and Nizhnii 
Novgorod, had internal leaders, who from early stages organised and formed the 
women’s movement. A formal association was created at the beginning of April, 
predating the central soldatki organisation formed in Petrograd, with the aim to 
improve soldatki conditions of life.43 A reflection of their self-awareness as a group 
was the formal photograph taken of the committee members together. INSERT 
PHOTOGRAPH HERE The well dressed, educated looking women in the photograph 
give a rare indication of the social character of these organic soldatki leaders. Their 
dress and demeanour suggest that they were professional women, like teachers or 
clerks. The Kazan soldatki union was initiated by the women themselves, and not at 
the behest of the Soviet as in Tambov and Nizhnii Novgorod. The level of soldatki 
organisation in Kazan was accordingly at a much higher level. At their meeting in 
May, red flags were prepared, inscribed with “bread” and “increase the allowance for 
soldatki”.44 The secretary of the union, Zinaida Matveevna Antonova, stood as a 
candidate for the Town Duma.45 Despite this higher level of executive organisation, a 
commentator remarked that: 
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The administration could not, however, restrain the poor, hungry, barely conscious 
women to whom it seemed that no measures had been taken for improvement of their 
situation.46 
This comment must be read with caution; it may reflect the prejudices of the 
Soviet reporter, and a desire to belittle soldatki organisation. It does however suggest 
that the leaders of the soldatki were absolutely distinct from the soldatki themselves, 
confirming the impression from their photograph of educated professionals, far 
removed from the peasants and workers that made up the mass of soldatki. It also 
indicates that though the Kazan soldatki had internal leaders and administrators, this 
leadership was far more moderate and conventional than the majority of the Kazan 
soldatki, and was unable to restrain its ‘followers’.  
Soldatki operated on a number of levels in voicing their grievances, and 
attempting to extract concessions from the authorities. They submitted written 
statements, participated in administrative organisations, and acted autonomously, 
outside these established organisations, in order to attract public support for their 
pleas, and to put direct pressure on the administration.  A common feature of the 
presentation of these grievances was the enthusiasm of the women to present their 
grievances collectively, rather than individually.47 The majority of soldatki complaints 
and requests were addressed to the Soviet of soldiers’ deputies, and not to the 
guberniia or uezd commissars. This is a telling reflection of the balance of power in 
the guberniias and of the prestige of the Soviets. The most common forms of address 
were written petitions, complaints or requests, submitted both independently and 
collectively. A large collection of soldatki letters of grievance has been preserved in 
the Nizhnii Novgorod State Archive.48 Some of these were written by the women 
themselves, and others composed on their behalf by a scribe or other literate person. 
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In a number of cases soldiers interceded personally on behalf of their wives, both 
singly and collectively. At a general meeting of the 183rd reserve infantry regiment, on 
20 April, it was decreed after fierce discussion: 
[...] To commandeer a delegate and send a telegram to the war minister and to the 
Soviet of soldiers’ deputies in Petrograd, in order to quickly clarify the question about 
increase in soldatki pay, allowance for their families and pensions for invalids, 
declaring in all seriousness the reasons motivating this step.49 
The collective action taken by soldatki shows that they found sufficient 
common ground, in the urgency of their pleas and in their lack of direct representation 
in government, to act together. There were instances where joint soldatki action was 
grouped by village or volost. In certain cases it was a response to a specific problem. 
The women of one volost used a pre-printed form to appeal about the non-payment of 
their allowances. Their husbands had been taken prisoner voluntarily, which classified 
them as deserters, thus leaving their families ineligible for state support. This excerpt 
from Daria Ivanovna Saiunovna’s letter illustrates the powerless position of these 
women: 
My husband, Ivan Vasilivech Saiunov of the 48th Siberian regiment, was taken 
prisoner and is still imprisoned. Since his capture I have not received allowance for 
his family, of myself and his two children aged five and four [...] the administration 
declared the last time I was given allowance that my husband gave himself over 
voluntarily as a prisoner and that is why I will receive no further allowance. I request 
to the Soviet of soldiers’ deputies to come to my family’s aid, since I am not guilty of 
anything and must struggle with needy children in such difficult and hungry times, I 
don’t actually know if my husband is guilty, and I cannot say anything about his 
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motivations in handing himself over, but if he is guilty, then why are his innocent 
children going hungry in a state of poverty [...]50 
The complaints submitted, even when individually written, rather than a mass 
complaint or a pre-printed form, were often very formulaic in their style. As in the 
pre-revolutionary period, petitioners invoked a combination of formal rules and moral 
principles in support of their claims. 51 The new expectations and rhetoric of 
revolution did have a significant impact on the form of these complaints. Petitioners 
frequently referred to their rights, rather than just relying on moral principles and 
charity. It was usual for the soldatka to mention, in order, herself, the names and ages 
of her children, and the names and ages of dependent elderly parents (those mentioned 
were almost always the birth parents of the soldier, and not his wife.) Nadezhda 
Grigorevna Fel’man’s appeal to the Soviet of soldiers’ deputies, dated 19 May 1917, 
is typical in form: 
I humbly request that you consider carefully the situation of my family as stated 
below, and do not refuse my request. I am a weak, sick woman. My son Vladimir was 
taken into military service, and he is my sole source of nourishment and sustenance. I 
petitioned about the receipt of state allowance but was always refused. I have with me 
my daughter Maria aged nine, and as a result of poor health, and malnourishment 
through the rising cost of living, I am not able to work and feed myself. In this grave 
situation, I do not receive allowance.52 
The request of Sophia Fedorovna Patkin to the Soviet of soldiers and workers’ 
deputies is also typical. She was a peasant-soldatka from Kostianskii volost, 
Arzamasskii uezd, Nizhegorodskaia guberniia: 
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I, the undersigned Sophia Fedorovna Patkin, 21 years old, with a little two year old 
boy child in my arms, humbly ask the Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies to 
investigate the conditions of my situation: My husband Feodor Filipovich Patkin was 
taken into active military service on 18 June 1915, and so already for two years while 
he served I was left with a little child without any means for subsistence, and taking 
into account the rising prices and generally difficult situation, since I am still bound to 
my child.53 
A relatively common phenomenon in these complaints was the direct relation 
presented by the soldatki of what they were giving to the state, and what they 
expected in return. The rhetoric of complaint blurred into the reality of their situation 
– they had given their sons and their husbands to the national interest, and their 
contribution to the state was the blood of their kin. The justification given to the 
Nizhegorodskii uezd commissar by soldatki for their non-payment of taxes was that 
since their husbands were away spilling their blood, the wives would not give any 
money to the state.54 An appeal from the Kazan soldatki organisation directly declared 
to women that they had lost their sons and brothers and husbands to the war, and now 
were compelled to defend their own families, who faced want and hunger.55 The 
language of the battlefield was directly employed in the domestic sphere.  
 The soldatki of Kazan and Tambov did not restrict themselves to the language 
of the battlefield. Their demands were also presented directly to the guberniia 
administration, sometimes in violent or threatening forms. The direct action of 
soldatki during 1917 was in some respects a continuation of the food riots seen 
throughout the war period in Russia, which were often led by women.56 It also 
resonates with descriptions of peasant women’s protest during the late 1920’s and 
early 1930’s.57 From the very beginnings of revolution, the Tambov soldatki formed 
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an intimidating presence in the guberniia, and directly threatened the administration 
of the town. Initially, the public committee that formed in the wake of the revolution 
bore the brunt of their anger. A meeting of the Tambov Town Duma58 on 20 March, 
which included Soviet representatives, dealt mainly with the question of soldatki: 
Soldatki had already declared lack of faith in the public committee. This mistrust was 
to have serious implications. Around 500 soldatki gathered and went to the public 
committee, demanding the key for the provisions storerooms. All explanations and 
requests had no effect. The soldatki stood their ground and declared that the public 
committee had embezzled all money for the soldatki, that fuel and means had been 
distributed unfairly and so on and so on. The soldatki did not of course provide any 
concrete accusations, as they couldn’t. All it came to was noise and shouting. A 
representative of the committee gave the key to a representative of the Soviet of 
workers and soldiers’ deputies, who had been commandeered for the pacification of 
the soldatki. The soldatki meeting, at cafe number one, was very noisy. The soldatki 
continued to insult members of the public committee, calling them thieves and other 
such things. At last after great effort twenty delegates were elected and they were 
commissioned to carry out a revision of the public committee.59 
This fracas set the tone for future soldatki relations with both the town 
committees and later the Soviet in Tambov. This atmosphere of open hostility was 
also witnessed in Kazan, where soldatki consistently undermined and challenged 
decisions made by both town committees and the Soviet. At a meeting held by the 
Kazan soldatki union in May, demands were voiced for provision of sugar and white 
flour, and for the increase of their allowance above the already agreed increase from 
three to seven roubles, up to a new sum of twenty roubles. The meeting’s participants 
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were counselled by one of the orators to go to the Soviet to lay down their demands, 
since the Soviet “defended all toiling and impoverished people”.60 At this, the entire 
meeting marched to the gates of the palace where the Soviet was in session. The 
besieged Soviet sent a representative to pacify the women, and entreated them to elect 
ten representatives to come into the Soviet building and clarify their situation.61 The 
Soviet sponsored newspaper afterwards reported that the women’s anger was 
misdirected- they had received no response from the town administration to their 
pleas because they had provided no correspondence address, and their representative 
had not been present when the Soviet discussed their case. The Soviet clarified to the 
women’s representatives that telegrams had been sent to the war minister about the 
plight of soldatki, and invited their representatives to the next Soviet meeting, where 
soldatki grievances would be discussed. Whilst this was sufficient to diffuse the rising 
anger of the assembled women, it did not avert the women’s march around the town, 
complete with banners and placards, demanding that their complaints be heard.62 Such 
public demonstration of dissatisfaction with the Soviet’s actions in defending the 
working people was potentially injurious to the Soviet’s reputation.  
The following week the Kazan Soviet held a public session in the town 
theatre, in which soldatki issues were discussed. The decision to hold a public session 
is significant, as it reflects the level of public concern and mistrust the soldatki issue 
was raising, and the Soviet’s concern to address the grievances of its chosen 
constituents. The choice of a theatre as the meeting’s location, whilst no doubt a 
practical choice given the number of delegates and audience, was apt, as the meeting 
developed into something of a public spectacle. A report of the meeting, written by an 
unnamed Soviet member and published in Kazanskaia rabochaia gazeta, gave an 
unsettling account of the stormy meeting. He declared, “It is difficult and even useless 
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to give a detailed report on the meeting”.63 Soviet deputies, the supposed chosen 
representatives of the people (narod), were challenged and shouted down, most 
vocally by the soldatki and their supporters: 
Discussion of the soldatki question went on for more than four hours and by the end 
there was a storm even above the discussion. Amid worrying noise, shouts both from 
the public and from the Soviet members, the meeting was closed at one in the 
morning. In the Soviet there was no one who did not feel for the condition of the 
soldatki, and the speeches of the soldatki wrenched blood from the hearts of all that 
listened. But it was impossible for soldatki needs to be satisfied, because neither the 
state nor the Soviet had the means. The Soviet decided to do all that it could, but only 
what it could [...] attempts were made at heavy blows on the Soviet; it was even said 
that the Soviet had increased means for officers’ wives but not for soldatki. There has 
never been discussion in the Soviet about officers’ wives. It was unconscious force 
against the Soviet, rising anarchism and worrying provocation.64 
This recalls the description of the Tambov soldatki meeting of March, where 
the two soldiers who had called it were unable to maintain order in the face of 
sustained soldatki haranguing and disorderly conduct. In the case of Kazan, soldatki 
participation in the Soviet resulted in the Soviet losing its own decorum, rather than 
the soldatki gaining any. The plight of the Kazan soldatki was a real public issue; 
while their marches and noisy participation in meetings no doubt contributed to a 
prominent public profile, the effect was redoubled by the Soviet’s willingness to 
organise a range of public collections and charitable fund raising events on behalf of 
the soldatki. For example, a concert-lottery was held on the 28 May, to be followed by 
a funfair (narodnoe gulian’e), with all funds raised going to the soldatki.65 Such 
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events were regular features in the town’s public calendar. One can reflect that such 
public events were, however, a double-edged sword for the Soviet. While they may 
well have been effective in collecting funds, and in publicly demonstrating that the 
Soviet were active on behalf of soldatki, they also highlighted the women’s continued 
demands, and the inability of the Soviet effectively to meet these demands. 
Responses to soldatki grievances 
The activism of Kazan soldatki proved to be highly effective in winning them a 
prominent public profile, and real concessions. The plight of soldatki was among the 
most persistent themes covered in the Kazan military district’s newspaper.66 The 
soldatki union was granted use of the Zhuravlev building, situated within the Kremlin, 
as an office,67 and in August was provided with a house to operate as a hostel to house 
those soldatki with emergency housing needs. Guberniia and uezd zemstva were 
petitioned to set up cheap cafes for soldatki, and to take other measures to provide for 
needy soldatki. The town administration was commissioned to satisfy soldatki with 
firewood, and soldatki were given representation in the Soviet, and on provisions and 
accommodation commissions.68 Seven cheap cafes were established around Kazan 
town itself to satisfy soldatki needs. These cafes were forced to close in September, 
however, as a result of:  
difficulties with the provisions situation, which made it more and more difficult to 
satisfy the lunchers, and in connection with the accusations of the soldatki, who were 
not satisfied with these lunches.69 
The prominence of soldatki in Kazan was particularly notable, but was to 
some extent mirrored by the attention given to soldatki issues by resolutions of almost 
all local government organisations in Nizhnii Novgorod and Tambov as well, from the 
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village skhod and volost committees, up to the guberniia commissar. The plight of 
soldatki was widely acknowledged, and a range of measures proposed for their relief, 
including prioritising soldatki in receiving rented landowners’ property,70 providing 
assistance in field work,71 free or cheap firewood,72 and preventing their eviction from 
rented accommodation.73 The importance attributed by local government to the 
satisfaction of soldatki demands is apparent, and indicates the success of the soldatki 
in pressing their case.   
The ways in which the administration represented the soldatki and their plight 
gives some indication of their public image. Soviet and Provisional Government 
bodies alike employed the language of the battlefield, as the soldatki themselves did, 
in their attempts to raise public support for the soldatki. A common refrain was that it 
was society’s responsibility to protect the families of those men who shed their blood 
for the motherland. A direct connection was made between the blood sacrifice made 
by the soldiers, and the need for people to reciprocate in like, and thus to acknowledge 
their sacrifice. In a big advertisement appealing for help for the soldatki, run by the 
cultural-enlightenment committee of the Soviet of soldiers and workers’ deputies, it 
was repeatedly asked: 
What will we say to the soldiers suffering in the trenches about the hunger and 
suffering of their women and children?74 
This language is important in understanding the prominent role played by 
symbolism. The complexities of the soldatki position were painted over by the broad 
brushstrokes of national sacrifice and salvation. The necessary suffering of the men in 
the trenches was mirrored by the perceivably avoidable suffering of their women and 
children. The sufferings of soldatki contributed to the overall impression of a nation 
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mobilised, a nation in deathly struggle. Alongside these appeals to patriotic duty, the 
guberniia administration and the press perpetuated ‘poor victim’ stereotypes of 
soldatki.75 In the context of 1917, this can be regarded as an implicit attempt to 
depoliticise the soldatki agenda. Sympathy offered in the democratic press to these 
‘poor, illiterate women’ implied or stated directly that the soldatki were a wholly 
unconscious group, who operated only on base instinct. Soldatki were routinely 
mentioned along with the poor, refugees and destitute.76 By classifying the state of 
soldatki as deserving of charity, soldatki demands were depoliticised. To make 
specific comparisons, all democratic organisations supported without question the 
implementation of an eight-hour working day, as the right of a working man. The 
right of soldiers to receive polite treatments from their seniors was upheld as due 
treatment for citizens and comrades. Soldatki demanded as their citizens’ rights 
support from the state to maintain a tolerable standard of living. Though it was 
practical difficulties that prevented the administration from fulfilling this demand, 
they did not portray soldatki as equal citizens, but as subjects for pity and for charity. 
This reflects the way in which the (exclusively male) local government leaders and 
journalists refused to recognise soldatki as a political force in their own right. This 
depoliticisation echoes the attitudes shown by communist party officials towards 
peasant women’s protest during collectivisation.77 
The soldatki movement did not self consciously identify itself as ‘political’; 
that is, it did not take up the programme of a political party, or try to present itself as a 
political organisation, in the way that other interest groups did.78 None of the sources 
mention specific links between soldatki and political parties. The intransigent soldatki 
had potential affinity with the Bolshevik movement, but though they sometimes 
shared common ground in 1917, the Bolsheviks were little more than travelling 
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companions with the soldatki.79 There was an appeal published in a Kazan Bolshevik 
controlled newspaper in May to join the soldatki union.80 It is a fair assumption that 
soldatki support for the Bolsheviks probably related to the dynamic of heightened 
Bolshevik support among other social groups in the latter part of 1917. A summary of 
reports at the Tambov guberniia peasant meeting on 18 November confirms that 
soldatki on the whole supported the Bolsheviks, but suggested that this support was 
predicated solely on the desire to see an end to the war: 
From the reports it was clear that Bolshevism, as an ideological tendency, had not 
actually penetrated the peasant midst. Its exponents in the villages were 
predominantly soldiers from the rear, the majority of whom were ignorant people who 
knew neither the programme of Bolshevism or of any other programme [...] The 
security of their success lay solely, as everywhere, in their promise of rapid peace. 
Bolshevik supporters were found only among soldatki, interested in rapid peace and 
thinking in their darkness, that Bolsheviks were able to give it to the people [...]81 
The issue of the war was the one that most surely developed soldatki 
grievances and actions from local demands for satisfaction of material wants to 
national concerns. If the soldatki made specific association between their grievous 
material condition and the war, which widowed or beggared them, their complaints 
could take on a specifically political bent. There is however no evidence from the 
guberniias considered that soldatki organisations addressed these national concerns in 
any coherent way. An unnamed Soviet delegate,82 reporting on a public meeting of the 
Kazan Soviet of workers and soldiers’ deputies on 18 May 1917, which discussed the 
soldatki question, implied that the soldatki were unknowing vehicles for counter-
revolution and anarchy, and that their support for Bolshevik resolutions was a 
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reflection of their “dark unconsciousness”.83 Notions of ‘darkness’, usually implying 
ignorance, illiteracy and lack of culture, were symptomatically applied to the rural 
population by its intelligentsia observers, and were often particularly directed towards 
women.84 Such language tells us more about the commentator’s own fear and 
ignorance of unfamiliar or unwelcome societal norms and trends than about the 
allegedly ‘dark’ subjects.85 A Bolshevik commentator in the paper Rabochii quite 
rightly challenged this unnamed author and asked what constituted anarchism. By the 
definition presented by the Soviet delegate, anarchism was constituted by demands for 
bread and a conclusion to the war.  
Conclusions 
This study of the soldatki movement forces us to reconsider our categorisations of 
‘political’ behaviour. Soldatki themselves may not have been self consciously 
political, in that they did not often take on party political identities. They were not 
generally recognised by the press and political activists as political actors, but as 
‘dark’ forces, responding to their material needs. Their insistence to have their needs 
met, their presentation of grievances in collective and concerted forms, and their 
direct participation in the peripheries of power, however, necessitates that their protest 
be considered political. Soldatki demands reflected a broader crisis for the moderate 
leadership of the Soviets. From the outset of revolution, but particularly from August 
onwards, the Soviets were faced with direct challenges from their constituents, who 
demanded that they pursue more radical policy, most particularly demanding a split 
with the Provisional Government on the war issue, and greater control over the 
provisions crisis.86 The results of this crisis of power varied from region to region. In 
Nizhnii Novgorod, moderates retained control of the Soviets until a re-election was 
forced on them by the Bolsheviks on 30 October 1917. In Kazan, on the other hand, 
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the Bolsheviks formed the strongest single group even in September, and the leftist 
tendencies of the SR group there meant that the Soviet was dominated by a left 
SR/Bolshevik alliance.87  
Three key areas addressed by this study have broader implications for our 
understanding of 1917. Firstly, soldatki are a valuable exemplar of female 
participation in revolutionary politics. Soldatki have been marginalized in the 
historiography of 1917, and recognising their importance as political actors realigns 
the picture of revolution away from something defined and directed by male workers 
and soldiers. While soldatki, along with all women, were on the periphery of formal 
power structures in 1917, they organised themselves and placed significant pressure 
on these formal power structures. They also developed a prominent public profile. 
Secondly, the continued and escalated demands of soldatki show how the political 
revolution of February 1917 dramatically heightened popular expectations of what 
government could deliver, but correspondingly worsened the economic and 
administrative problems Russia faced. This was an explosive combination, which 
offers some insight into the Bolsheviks’ growing support in 1917. The glimmering 
promise of a better future through political participation seemed to be a chimera, as 
conditions worsened despite the proliferation of representative government. Finally, 
the nature of the directly democratic Soviets, and the problem of where their power 
and authority really lay, is brought into relief. The Soviets’ popular image as the body 
representing all toiling and impoverished people placed a massive burden of 
expectation on them. Their requirement to be responsive to national concerns, 
however, along with the pressure laid upon them by Russia’s financial crisis, left them 
in an ambiguous position, whereby they were practically unable to satisfy the 
demands laid on them by their constituents. Soldatki rejected the leadership of both 
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Provisional Government bodies and the Soviets, leaving them as political ‘loose 
cannon’. This contributed to the sense of political crisis, which pervaded the latter 
months of 1917.  
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